Basic guide to corruption and migration

There are approximately 304 million international migrants worldwide. 2024 estimates suggest that 51.7 million people – one in six international migrants globally – have been forcibly displaced across international borders. Women and girls who migrate often pay a heavy toll. What is the relationship between corruption and these movements of people? Corruption is both a driver and an enabler of migration. It also affects humanitarian and development support to migrants and host communities, and it shapes the impact of migration on development outcomes in the country of origin.

Corruption as a driver of migration

Corruption and perceptions of governance are crucial factors influencing migration. The MIGNEX project surveyed over 13,000 young adults across 26 communities in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to explore local migration and development trends. As part of this research, Caso et al. (2023) found that dissatisfaction with public services, poor governance, and lack of institutional trust are stronger drivers of migration aspirations and high outward migration rates than poverty, limited livelihood options, environmental degradation, insecurity, and conflict. These findings challenge existing narratives about migration's root causes, highlighting the importance of addressing corruption, public service provision, and institutional trust to manage migration effectively and promote sustainable development.

Nonetheless, to ‘tackle the root causes of migration’ effectively, the European Union (EU) and its member states aim primarily to reduce poverty, conflict, and environmental degradation without necessarily taking into account the role corruption plays in creating and sustaining these sources of insecurity. Zina Weisner, therefore, argues that the 'root cause approach is flawed' since it may overlook ‘deeper, less apparent issues within institutions and society including low salaries, poor management, and the lack of accountability driving corruption and outward migration.

A further critique is the role of North American and European governments in supporting corrupt regimes in countries of migrant origin, which lack incentives to improve the living conditions of the poorest citizens at the same time as they repress political opponents and protect violent transnational criminal organisations (see examples from Honduras and Tunisia).

Restrictive migration policies as a driver of corruption

State policies aiming to curb irregular migration exacerbate corruption by pushing it into more dangerous and more remote channels. By concentrating on interception, redirection, and repatriation rather than addressing the systemic drivers of migration – such as corruption – these policies perpetuate suffering and exploitation with thousands of migrants losing their lives every year during their journeys, including in unseaworthy boats. Many migrants from Libya and Tunisia end up in unseaworthy boats, leading to tragic outcomes as their bodies are found either at sea or washed ashore in southern Tunisia.

The lack of legal migration channels often forces people to take irregular routes, relying on smugglers and, in some cases, traffickers. Suber describes how smugglers use corruption to circumvent border restrictions, focusing particularly on the role of bribery in the survival economy of border communities on the Syrian-Turkish border, and the Evros border between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria. Jancsics has looked at how agents along the U.S.-Mexico border exploit the situation for personal profit. And finally, a UNOCD report on smuggling and trafficking in Southeast Asia gives a useful overview of how corruption facilitates both activities.

In contrast to smuggling, which is defined as the facilitation of (unauthorised) mobility, human trafficking entraps individuals in situations of forced labour, sexual exploitation, or criminal activities. The 2022 World migration report indicates that nearly half of identified trafficking victims were trafficked across international borders, while the 2022 Global estimates of modern slavery, reveal that migrant workers are three times more likely to be exploited in forced labour within the private sector compared to local workers. Corruption exists throughout the trafficking in persons chain, from recruitment and provision of documents to the criminal justice response. In exchange for money, sexual favours, or other benefits, police and other officials ignore sites where trafficked persons work or tip off business owners to impending checks. Investigators may pursue smaller offences to cover for the main exploiters.

For victims of trafficking, the perception that corruption is rampant may discourage them from reporting. The OECD has issued Guiding principles on combatting corruption related to trafficking in persons, which promotes the joint investigation of corruption and trafficking cases.

Externalisation policies: empowering corrupt actors

Externalisation policies including partnerships forged with countries of origin and transit can feed corrupt networks. In Libya and Tunisia, the EU and individual countries fund and train security forces including militia groups to prevent and contain migrant departures. In practice, and compounded in Libya by the absence of state governance since 2011, such policies have strengthened smuggling networks that exploit migrants through violence and coercion. Scharrer emphasises the pivotal role that corruption plays in the realm of ransom smuggling and shows how the establishment of buffer zones and enhanced border security have led to an upsurge in smuggling and hostage-taking, as smugglers adjust to the heightened risks and expenses.

Another useful analysis with case studies from Sudan, Niger, and Tunisia exposes the corrupt systems that enable migrant trafficking in these areas. For example, it highlights the participation of Sudan’s NISS officers in smuggling migrants from Eritrea to Khartoum, Libya, and Egypt, drawing a parallel to the practices during Gaddafi’s era when border control was manipulated for financial gain under the guise of cooperation with the EU.

In Tunisia, the collusion of the Tunisian Security Forces in migrant smuggling operations combined with racist attacks on Black African migrants has resulted in a highly volatile and violent situation. The research shows how the externalisation policies championed by many wealthier countries perpetuate corruption and human trafficking and contributes to the further degradation of already fragile states.

Corruption in refugee protection

Corrupt practices both facilitate and undermine access to assistance and asylum for refugees and host communities. Because asylum is a limited good, immigration authorities may ask for bribes to grant access to the border, to an interview, to fast-track applications, or to grant a positive decision. A Corruption Watch report gives a useful overview of how corruption impacts migrants seeking protection in South Africa. In some contexts, (eg Bangladesh) refugees have been arrested and detained in order to extort money by asylum state authorities responsible for their protection.

Other forms of corruption include the inflation of refugee numbers, embezzlement of funds meant for food and other assistance, and the sale of refugee women and girls for forced marriage. An LSE blog about the refugee scandal in Uganda describes some of the dynamics of fraud and corruption in refugee settlements.

In the Dadaab camp in Kenya, Somali refugees have complained that UN staff ask for money in return not just for food but also for expedited repatriation. Corruption has also been alleged within the selection process for UNHCR-facilitated third-country resettlement. Reporting mechanisms are in place to identify and respond to such forms of corruption, but challenges remain concerning the communication of these measures as well as their implementation in contexts where investigative capacities are limited. Another barrier, as illustrated in Uganda, could be the international community’s collective commitment to support ‘role model’ refugee hosting countries and therefore turn a blind eye to certain accountability gaps.

As part of state and international commitments to support the self-reliance of refugees, the EU and other actors have supported labour integration programmes in countries of first asylum. U4 publication shows how corruption and other barriers have shaped the uptake of such programmes for Syrian refugees in Jordan.

Corruption shapes the process of return of migrants to their home countries or their integration into third countries. In a U4 Brief, Paasche explores how voluntary return schemes supported by many European countries are compromised not only by actual corruption but also by perceptions of it due to inefficiencies in assistance delivery. Further, sustainable returns may be undermined by corruption to the degree it affects access to livelihoods, property, and protection in the receiving community.