

# U4 Expert Answer



## Overview of corruption and anti-corruption: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

### Query

**What is the present corruption situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)?**

### Purpose

This answer is an update of a [country profile on the DRC](#) that was prepared for the U4 in 2010 with a stronger focus on the public administration and state-owned enterprises. For more information on corruption in the natural resource sector, see this 2013 [Helpdesk answer on the DRC](#).

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### Summary

As the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has endured a long period of violence and instability, the country continues to struggle with conflict, repeated political crises, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources and entrenched corruption. On-going fighting over the control of the DRC's considerable mineral wealth sustains a climate of violence, insecurity and public discontent in the eastern provinces, fuelling

the country's persistent governance crisis and undermining its capacity to escape the trap of mismanagement, conflict and poverty.

The DRC's public administration is undermined by a significant waste of state resources. Some of the most pressing concerns are its weak capacity for revenue collection, corruption by revenue collection services and tax evasion. Since 2010, many grand corruption cases in relation to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have come to light, on a scale large enough to undermine the state's capacity to benefit Congolese citizens.

Although President Kabila has declared his commitment to fighting corruption on numerous occasions, there is no strong empirical indication of firm political will, nor evidence of progress beyond the establishment of a legal framework, which is rarely enforced in practice. On the contrary, observers note that the anti-corruption agenda is often manipulated for political reasons. The establishment of transparent and accountable institutions is hampered by a rent-seeking elite and a complex web of political patronage that permeates all sectors of society.

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**Date:** 20 August 2015 **Number:** 2015:12

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## 1. Corruption in the DRC

### Background

Since independence in 1960, the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been marked by conflict, weak governance, economic mismanagement and widespread corruption. In 1997 Laurent Kabila overthrew President Mobutu Sese Seko after 32 years of authoritarian and corrupt rule and replaced the old regime with an equally authoritarian regime. Kabila soon led the country into a five-year regional war opposing government forces supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe and rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014). The war claimed up to six million lives through fighting or through indirect effects, like malnutrition, fuelling what is often considered one of the region's greatest humanitarian catastrophes in recent years (BBC 2015).

Following the assassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001, his son Joseph Kabila assumed power and resumed peaceful negotiations with various rebel groups and national stakeholders, leading to the creation of a transitional government and a formal end to the war in 2003. Joseph Kabila subsequently won the first multiparty elections since independence in 2006, which, despite a number of procedural flaws, raised hopes of restoring peace and stability and expanding the democratic space in the country. These hopes were disappointed by the flawed 2011 elections, in which Joseph Kabila was re-elected despite widespread irregularities denounced both internally and by the international community (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014; International Crisis Group 2015).

Rebel groups remain active in the north-eastern region in an on-going fight for control of eastern Congo's rich mineral deposits, and the reportedly Rwanda-backed armed group March 23 movement (M23) seized control of Goma in late 2012. In early 2013, the UN secured a regional agreement with 11 neighbouring countries to end the M23 rebellion in eastern areas and stabilise the country.

Most observers agree that the country's violence and instability are driven by both economic and political factors. The conflict was fuelled by the country's vast mineral wealth, which includes gold, copper, cobalt and diamonds, with all sides

taking advantage of the political instability to plunder natural resources. Revenues from the various mines provided funding for both sides of the conflict (Nelson 2013). This nurtured the rise of a predatory system of governance that persists in the post-war era. Decades of mismanagement and authoritarian rule led to inequitable distribution of resources, corruption and massive human rights violations, further breeding public discontent and social unrest (Shekhawat 2009).

Agriculture and extractive industries are the main pillars of the economy, accounting for 50% of the country's GDP (AfDB 2014). However, the country's poverty remains in sharp contrast with the potential of its natural wealth (AfDB 2014). Together with Niger, the DRC has the lowest human development score in the world in UNDP's 2014 Human Development Index (UNDP 2014). Most of the 60 million Congolese citizens still do not have access to running water, electricity, or education. The per capita income of US\$280 is lower than before the nation's independence in 1960 (Neate 2012).

The legitimacy crisis resulting from the contested 2011 elections, violence and insecurity in the eastern provinces, entrenched corruption, foreign interference and mismanagement of mineral resources continue to fuel violence, insecurity, human right abuses and poverty (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014; Freedom House 2015).

### Extent of corruption

Major international governance indicators point to persistent, widespread and endemic forms of corruption in the DRC, permeating all sectors of society. There is little evidence of progress made in anti-corruption in the post-conflict era.

In 2014 the country ranked 154th of the 177 countries assessed in the [Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index \(CPI\)](#), scoring 22 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean).

These findings are consistent with the [World Bank's 2013 Worldwide Governance Indicators](#) in which the DRC performs extremely poorly on all the six dimensions of governance assessed, scoring below 10 (on a 0 to 100 scale) in all categories: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Significant progress has only

been made in the field of regulatory quality (from 4.3 to 9.6 since 2010).

Corruption permeates most government sectors and institutions in the DRC. The vast majority of citizens interviewed within the framework of Transparency International's [2013 Global Corruption Barometer](#) perceived government bodies, including political parties, parliament, the judiciary, the military, the police, as well as public officials and civil servants, as highly corrupt. NGOs, religious bodies and medical/health services were seen as highly corrupt by less than a third of the interviewed people. Consistent with these findings, 80% of respondents consider corruption a problem in the country, with 61% considering it a serious problem. Further, 66% of respondents think that corruption has increased in the three years preceding the survey. More than half of the respondents think that the government is run to a large extent by a few entities rather than for the benefit of all. More than two-thirds think that the government's efforts in fighting corruption are ineffective.

The DRC does not perform better on the 2015 Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom. It has an economic freedom score of 45, far below regional average (54.6), ranking it in the very bottom group of 168 countries in terms of economic freedom in the 2015 index. In particular, the country performed extremely poorly in terms of freedom from corruption, with a score of 22 on a scale of 0 to 100.

Mismanagement and corruption are found to raise the costs for and risks of conducting business, and, as a result, pose major obstacles to business development, while driving many economic activities into the informal sector (US Department of State 2015; [2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey](#)).

## Forms of corruption

### Petty corruption

Corruption permeates all levels of the state apparatus, involving a wide range of state officials, from low ranking civil servants to the highest members of government.

Reflecting this reality, the majority of citizens interviewed within the framework of the [2013 Global Corruption Barometer](#) reported having paid a bribe within the last 12 months prior to the

survey. The government sector that the respondents most often reported having to pay bribes to was the police (78% of respondents). About half of the respondents further reported having to pay bribes when in contact with the judiciary (54%), as well as officials in charge of utilities (51%), registry and permit (47%), tax revenue (40%) and education (40%).

Private companies are also routinely confronted by petty corruption. More than half the firms interviewed in the [2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey](#) reported having to pay at least one informal payment during different interactions, while bribes were requested or expected in more than half the transactions. Both these numbers are much higher than the average in lower income countries.

### Electoral corruption

The 2011 election highlighted major political and electoral corruption challenges in the country, with regards to voter and candidate registration, result manipulation and campaign financing, among others (Freedom House 2012). In some areas, security forces interfered in the electoral processes, while in others voters set fire to polling stations in protest against allegations of electoral fraud and ballot stuffing (Freedom House 2012). In three constituencies of the Katanga province, a voter turnout of 100% was registered, with all registered votes in favour of Kabila. This result raised major suspicions among election observers, leading the European Union, the Carter Center and national observer groups to question the credibility of the results (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014).

With only one and a half years before the next election, the DRC finds itself again in a difficult political climate (International Crisis Group 2015). After having been in power since 2001, the president is at the end of his second and last term, creating a fiery debate among both the party and the public. To maintain power, the government has made efforts to amend the constitution to allow a third term and also to delay the election through legal obstacles. At the same time, parts of the population have mobilised against these changes. In early 2015, protests against a new electoral law ended in violence (International Crisis Group 2015).

### Political patronage and clientelism

Observers note that the country has a long tradition of political patronage, manifesting itself, for example, in the over-representation of cabinet members loyal to the president. In addition, President Kabila increased his economic and political patronage system by replacing the heads of 37 state enterprises with his own allies, tightening his grip on economic and political power (Matti 2010). Complex patronage networks rather than party ideology or merit dictate the allocation of key positions in the administration, thus providing incentives for citizens to enter politics to join the rent-seeking ruling elite and access state resources and benefits (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014). It is believed that a significant share of resources of the ruling elite allegedly comes from illegal tapping of treasury resources by party members who occupy executive positions, as well as illegal commissions from public contract procedures (Ngoma-Binda et al. 2010).

### Corruption in the public administration

#### Corruption in tax and customs administration

Some of the most pressing concerns for the DRC's public administration are its weak capacity for revenue collection, corruption by revenue collection services and tax evasion (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014).

Taxation is a particularly problematic area. According to Freedom House, citizens are poorly informed about which fees are legal, and remain largely unaware of their rights in this regard. Taxes are mostly collected informally and illegally, undermining the development of accountability between citizens and the state (Freedom House 2015). In May 2015 the special advisor to the head of state (in charge of governance, anti-corruption issues and money laundering) stated that the DRC loses between US\$10 billion<sup>1</sup> and US\$15 billion of tax per annum to tax evasion (Radio Okapi 2015b).

The lack of transparency in state financial affairs and the complex system of taxation and regulations provide opportunities for corruption, resulting in the embezzlement of millions of

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<sup>1</sup> Transparency International takes "billion" to refer to one thousand million (1,000,000,000).

dollars every year (Freedom House 2015). Mining companies take advantage of the tax administration's lack of resources and capacity to develop tax avoidance schemes, undermining the government's capacity to generate revenues. A Congolese Senate commission concluded that the state was losing US\$450 million in taxes in the mining sector alone (Freedom House 2010).

Corruption in the tax and customs administration prevents oil and mining revenues from supporting development goals and benefitting Congolese citizens. The diversion of revenues is seen as one of the factors fuelling the conflict in the eastern part of the country, since armed groups finance their operations from the informal taxes they collect at border crossings (Freedom House 2015).

Customs administration is poorly structured and suffers from a lack of resources, infrastructure and equipment, as well as from red tape, the overstaffing of posts and widespread corruption. Malpractices include underestimating the volume of goods, colluding with customs officers to declare goods that are taxed at a lower rate than the goods that were actually imported, or bribery to evade customs fees (Global Witness 2006).

#### Public financial management

Opaque revenue distribution further creates a conflict between local and national levels, providing local authorities with incentives to circumvent the revenue administration system (Freedom House 2010).

Recruitment and bidding procedures are rarely competitive or made public (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014). Independent audits are rare and the DRC performs very poorly – well below the world or region's average in the 2012 Open Budget Index, with a score of 18%. The government provides scant information to the public on the central government's budget and financial activity during the budget year, making it impossible for citizens to hold the government accountable for its management of public funds. As a result, state resources can be easily siphoned off for private or political purposes, as reflected by 2008 audit reports which claimed that an estimated US\$1.8 billion had been embezzled by various state agencies and parastatals (Bertelsmann Foundation 2010). In June 2011, the senate adopted a new public finance law to improve the management of public expenditure,



including provisions for more accountable budget reporting (Freedom House 2015).

### State-owned enterprises

The management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remains an area of concern. In the transition period, the management of these companies was assigned to the signatories of the peace agreement. Former warlords were appointed to run the companies and routinely abused their position for private gain, leading to considerable losses to the budget. As a result of corruption and mismanagement, SOEs have failed to contribute substantively to the nation's welfare.

Since 2010 numerous grand corruption cases in relation to SOEs have come to light, on a scale large enough to undermine the state's capacity to benefit Congolese citizens. In particular, mines and other resources are undervalued and sold off to middlemen for a price well below their actual value, then sold on to another company at market value. Because the beneficial owners of the involved offshore companies are unknown, it cannot be ruled out that the profit is then spread among corrupt government officials and their allies in the business world (The Economist 2013).

A UN expert panel lead by Kofi Annan assessed the value of government-owned mines sold in five different deals from 2010 to 2012, and compared them to the value they were sold for. They found a gap of US\$1.36 billion, double the state's annual budget for health and education. These deals represent only a few examples of bargains given away by the government (The Economist 2013). "With some of the world's richest mineral resources, the DRC appears to be losing out because state companies are systematically undervaluing assets. Concessions have been made on terms that appear to generate large profits for foreign investors, most of them registered in offshore centres, with commensurate losses for public finance," the UN report states (Wallis 2013).

## 2. Anti-corruption efforts in the DRC

President Kabila has declared on numerous occasions his commitment to fight corruption, but evidence of success is limited. In 2009, he launched a "zero tolerance" campaign, which led to the creation of a financial intelligence unit to fight money laundering and a number of high-

ranking civil servants have been dismissed on account of corruption. However, few officials have been prosecuted and convicted in courts (Freedom House 2012). According to many observers, the fight against corruption is being primarily directed against governors that the regime seeks to oust (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014; International Crisis Group 2010). Nevertheless, President Kabila recently appointed former minister for justice, Luzolo Bambi, as his special advisor on good governance and corruption issues. Mr Bambi immediately described corruption as being endemic in the DRC, and recently reported that whistleblowers had brought to his attention incidences of corruption and embezzlement in many sectors of DRC government (Radio Okapi 2015a; Radio Okapi 2015c).

The country has weak legal and institutional mechanisms in place to ensure accountability, as well as limited capacity to respond to the country's daunting governance challenges. High levels of patronage continue to undermine the establishment of transparent, accountable institutions, and the rent-seeking elites generally lack the incentives and political will to build strong institutions to curb corruption (Matti 2010).

### Legal framework

Under pressure from the international community, a number of anti-corruption reforms have been initiated. However, ownership and commitment of the Congolese government to these reforms is questioned in most reports.

The DRC has been a signatory member of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) since 2010 and passed its own anti-corruption law in 2004. The law is largely perceived as providing an adequate legal framework to fight corruption and was rated as very strong on Global Integrity's DRC 2006 scorecard (Global Integrity 2006). All forms of corruption are prohibited and abuse of public office for personal gain can be punished by up to 15 years in prison; however, there is little enforcement (Freedom House 2012). In addition to ratifying the UNCAC, the DRC has signed the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. In September 2007, the DRC ratified the protocol agreement with the Southern African Development Community on fighting corruption.

Other anti-corruption related legal provisions are included in the constitution and the code of ethics of public officials, which require the head of state, government officials and civil servants to submit asset declarations to the constitutional court upon entering and leaving office. However, these provisions are poorly implemented to date, due to a lack of legislation and public access to collected data, which prevents effective monitoring of public officials' assets declarations (Chêne 2010).

In the area of public finance management, legislation on the public procurement code, which was adopted and promulgated in 2010, is not being sufficiently respected (AfDB 2012).

The constitution and the 2004 law govern the organisation and functioning of political parties, including matters to do with political party funding and finance. A law on the public financing of political parties was passed, but not enforced, with opaque criteria for determining eligibility for public financing, leaving a profound imbalance between political parties in favour of the pro-government coalition of parties.

The 2004 Money Laundering Act criminalises money laundering and terror financing and provides for a financial intelligence unit. Under this law, the DRC cooperates with African and European crime fighting organisations.

To date there is no access to information law in the DRC. As information dissemination is poorly developed, many citizens do not know the laws and regulations that affect their personal lives and remain largely unaware of their rights and obligations (Freedom House 2015).

As of 2012 there were no specific provisions to protect whistleblowers in place (Freedom House 2012). On the contrary, whistleblowers can face retaliation when denouncing corruption. A whistleblower working for the tax agency was allegedly dismissed for denouncing large-scale tax evasion by a multinational company (*Ligue Congolaise de Lutte contre la Corruption* 2010).

In recent years the DRC has made incremental progress in terms of revenue reporting and contract transparency, showing a willingness to comply with international standards, such as the one proposed by the IMF (Natural Resource Governance Institute 2015). The IMF Fiscal Transparency Guidelines require clear rules and principles and a clearly articulated system of

revenue sharing with subnational governments to be developed and implemented in an open consistent manner. It further requires publicly available information on resource-related spending, revenue and debt. In 2011, for example, the government passed a decree, agreeing to publish all government contracts relating to natural resources (oil, mining and forestry) within 60 days (Natural Resource Governance Institute 2015).

Following a one year suspension in 2013, the DRC is now also recognised as a compliant member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) after the implementation of a set of corrective actions requested by the EITI board. As published on the EITI website, the government produces annual reports which disclose revenues from the extraction of natural resources. After companies disclose what they pay in taxes and the government what it receives, the two figures are then compared and reconciled. In the first years of the DRC's membership, these numbers did not match, but since 2010 the numbers are significantly closer together. According to the EITI, the DRC has been making significant progress since 2014, having published contracts between the government and private oil, gas and mining companies, as well as the names of their beneficial owners (EITI 2015).

## Institutional framework

### The judiciary

The judiciary faces many challenges of resources, capacity and independence that undermine its ability to effectively prosecute corruption. While the constitution provides for the separation of powers, checks and balance do not effectively function in practice. The president appoints members of the judiciary with little consultation. In February 2008, for example, President Kabila forced 89 judges into retirement, including the president of the supreme court and the prosecutor general, and replaced them with 28 new, largely unqualified, magistrates. While he justified his decision as a corruption purge, most analysts considered it as an undue interference with the judiciary (Freedom House 2010).

The courts are under-financed, over-burdened and lack trained personnel, basic resources and capacity, including legal texts. They are mostly concentrated in urban areas and only a minority of the population has access to justice services, leaving most of citizens, especially outside

Kinshasa, reliant on customary courts (Freedom House 2015).

The judiciary lacks independence and suffers from widespread political interference and generalised corruption. The courts are reported to give favourable verdicts to the highest bidders or those close to the political elite (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014; Freedom House 2013).

Impunity is a serious problem, leaving a number of army officials involved in serious crimes, including murder, rape and the use of child soldiers, free from punishment (Freedom House 2015).

### **Ethics and anti-corruption commission**

The *Commission de l'Ethique et de la Lutte contre la Corruption* (CELC) was created in 2003 as one of the five "citizen" institutions mandated by the transitional constitution. Its mandate was mainly to raise awareness of the ethical issues and the fight against corruption; increase the capacity of national institutions to promote integrity; ensure that all national institutions involved in the fight against corruption have adequate operating capacity; investigate violations of ethical values and corrupt activities; and promote transparency in the political parties.

From its establishment, it faced major resource and logistical problems, including weak leadership, insufficient technical expertise and lack of independence. Paralysed by these various challenges, the CELC was finally not carried over into the new constitution (Freedom House 2010).

### **Financial intelligence unit**

As part of the "zero tolerance" campaign launched in September 2009, President Kabila established the *Cellule nationale des renseignements financiers* (CENAREF), DRC's financial intelligence unit, in October 2009 to combat money laundering and misappropriation of public funds. CENAREF is responsible for collecting and analysing information and conducting investigations on money laundering and terrorist financing cases, and advises the government on how to combat money laundering and terror financing. In practice, limited human and financial resources hamper the government's ability to enforce regulations, and local institutions and personnel lack training and capacity to fully enforce the law, preventing CENAREF from fully carrying out its responsibilities. A weak judicial system also impedes enforcement of anti-money

laundering regulations (US Department of State 2012).

### **The state auditor**

The state auditor (*Cour des Comptes*) is responsible for reviewing public expenditures and auditing state-run companies. The National Assembly can request it to investigate the government's management of public resources; however, it is considered to be largely ineffective (Freedom House 2010). The state auditor has neither the budgetary resources nor a specific website to publish comprehensive audit reports (Freedom House 2012). Public auditors' reports are largely ignored, and offenders incriminated in the reports are either left unpunished or are discreetly removed from their functions (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014).

### **Other stakeholders**

#### **Media**

While the freedom of speech and the press is guaranteed by the constitution, it is constrained by considerable government controls and restrictions. The government has used a wide range of licensing requirements, as well as security and criminal libel laws to restrict the freedom of the press (Freedom House 2015). Consistent with these findings, *Reporters sans Frontières* ranked the DRC 142 out of the 179 countries assessed in its [2013 Freedom of the Press Index](#).

Critical journalists and broadcasters are frequently harassed, intimidated, arrested or imprisoned by security forces. According to Freedom House, six journalists were beaten and 23 harassed during 2012 (Freedom House 2013). In 2013 the government cracked down on radio and television broadcasters criticising the government, through illegal raids, detentions, and the murder of a radio presenter (Freedom House 2014). As a result of the unconstitutional influence on the news media, a court ordered the High Council for Broadcasting and Communication (CSAC) to pay the owner of a private television station US\$40,000 in reparations for damage done to his business interests through prolonged and repeated suspensions of the station's programmes (Freedom House 2014). The government, however, continued its crackdown on the news media, having banned or declared defunct more than 130 newspapers since 2014. Reporters covering the conflict in the eastern provinces further face difficulties posed by

attacks, with one reporter killed while travelling on-site (Freedom House 2015).

There are not many quality media outlets with national coverage. The main newspapers are circulated in Kinshasa and the major cities, and radio is the dominant media in the country (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014). In spite of these limitations, there is an active private media both pro and anti-government which does not hesitate to challenge government views and provides a space for a lively debate on social and political issues (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014).

The government does not limit or censor online media; however, access is limited through the lack of infrastructure (Freedom House 2015).

### **Civil society**

Freedom of association and assembly is guaranteed by the constitution, and generally, civic organisations without a political agenda are able to operate without restriction (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014). A myriad of NGOs have emerged to provide basic services to compensate for ineffective provision of public services and fill gaps left by the government. There are about 5,000 registered NGOs in the country, most of which have a rather narrow focus devoted to local concerns (Freedom House 2015).

When they are politically active, civil society organisations run a high risk of intimidation, arrest and harassment. The government has intensified repressive measures against opposition groups since the elections, and opposition parties who positioned themselves against the ruling coalition were repeatedly harassed or constrained in their activities in the past few years, contributing to restricting the country's political space (Bertelsmann Foundation 2014).

There are many reports of activists being arbitrarily arrested, kidnapped or killed. In 2015 alone more than 40 people were killed protesting the proposed legislation intended to delay the 2016 elections in order to maintain President Kabila's power (Aljazeera 2015b). In March, more than 40 people were arrested during a conference aimed at encouraging civic and youth participation, and more than 10 people were arrested on the day after, protesting the detention of these 40 people (Aljazeera 2015; Freedom House 2015b).

### **The international community**

The DRC has received a total of more than US\$2 billion in international assistance, making it one of the top ten recipients of development aid in the world (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2012). Multilateral efforts focus on infrastructure (water, energy and transport), governance (improvement and enforcement of the legal and regulatory framework and public administration), as well as capacity building for the public administration (AfDB 2013).

China, the main donor according to the African Development Bank, focuses on infrastructure development – mainly roads and energy (AfDB 2013). Bilateral donors, such as the UK and the US, focus more on governance and the social sector including health, education and access to water. According to DFID and UKAid, the UK planned on spending more than US\$300 million (£198 million) per year until 2015. Major aims include social sector improvements, stopping the illegal exploitation of minerals and improving investment opportunities as well as the local and regional trade (UK Bilateral Aid Review 2011).

However, since the DRC has, in the eyes of its critics, failed to show that profit from natural resources is benefitting their citizens, many UK MPs are demanding development spending to be cut. According to Kofi Annan in the Africa Progress Report 2013, "Africa loses twice as much in illicit financial outflows as it receives in international aid" (Stewart 2013). According to an African Development Bank 2013-2017 strategy paper, much needs to be done to improve aid effectiveness in the country (AfDB 2013).

An AfDB 2011 report on international engagement in fragile States recommends the following for the DRC: (i) streamlining of national aid coordination mechanisms; (ii) capacity planning for the government; (iii) improving the distribution of work among partners; and (iv) public finance management reforms (AfDB 2013).

As member of the G7+ group on international dialogue on peacebuilding and state building, the DRC is in the process of starting to implement the "New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States". The agreement, signed in November 2011 by over 40 countries and international organisations, defines a new development strategy as well as new working methods, more closely adapted to the situation and challenges of fragile States (AfDB 2013).



Finally, it is important to recognise the role of the international business sector as well, where many global corporations are earning profits from DRC commodity riches, while corruption goes unaddressed, abets resource plunder and distorts and damages the DRC's development prospects.

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