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## Anti-corruption in peacebuilding practice

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Corruption erodes sustainable and inclusive development. It is both a political and technical challenge. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4) works to understand and counter corruption worldwide.

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**Despite the vital role of anti-corruption in sustaining peace, the scope and success of integrating anti-corruption provisions in peace agreements has never been examined. Our study finds that, in the last 34 years, anti-corruption provisions appeared in 36% of peace processes. The terms are stronger in substantive peace agreements, and less robust in pre-negotiation, ceasefire, or renewal arrangements. Anti-corruption advocates will achieve the best results by targeting a range of negotiation channels.**

## Main points

- Between 1990 and 2023, anti-corruption provisions appeared in 140 peace agreements signed as part of 62 peace processes (36%).
- Anti-corruption provisions are less commonly integrated into pre-negotiation, ceasefire, implementation or renewal agreements. In contrast, anti-corruption measures are often formulated during the negotiation of comprehensive peace agreements.
- Ceasefires rarely include anti-corruption provisions, although this could be an avenue for confidence building between conflict parties, especially commitments to third-party transparency initiatives – such as the inclusion of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative standards in the Myanmar process.
- Pre-negotiation agreements usually only include rhetorical and non-substantive commitments to an anti-corruption agenda but may establish anti-corruption as part of the reform agenda early in the process.
- Anti-corruption provisions mostly enable either ‘implementation of anti-corruption measures’ or a ‘commitment to sectoral anti-corruption reform’. ‘Asset recovery’ and ‘dealing with past incidents of corruption among officials’ only appear in 11 agreements, highlighting the contentious nature of these particular issues.
- Anti-corruption implementation is usually achieved through: a combination of establishing or reforming anti-corruption bodies (General Auditor’s Office, anti-corruption commission, budgetary oversight bodies, and the creation of specialised commissions); strengthening networks and communication between financial institutions, oversight bodies and law enforcement agencies; strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the power of the Public Prosecution; and bolstering the ‘checks and balances’ between the branches of government and their ability to dismiss or challenge corruption.

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# Abbreviations

**ARCSS** – Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan

**DRC** – Democratic Republic of the Congo

**LTTE** – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, Sri Lankan separatist militia

**NDC** - National Dialogue Conference (part of the Yemeni peace process, 2013-2014).

**PA-X** – Peace Agreements Database (dataset, University of Edinburgh)

**R-ARCSS** - Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan

**SDG** – Sustainable Development Goal

**UN** – United Nations

**UNCAC** - UN Convention against Corruption

**UNSC** – United Nations Security Council

# Are anti-corruption measures included in peace agreements?

Corruption, or ‘the abuse of entrusted authority for private gain’, thrives in war-to-peace transitions and is exacerbated by weak state institutions and large influxes of international funding.<sup>1</sup> An intensification of corruption after a political settlement is reached can rapidly undermine peace and plunge a country back into violent conflict.<sup>2</sup> The design of a negotiated settlement laid out in a peace agreement – a ‘formal, publicly available document, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to ending it’<sup>3</sup> – has been linked to post-war stabilisation. The process of negotiation, setbacks, and the agreement of terms by conflict parties collectively forms a peace process. This is largely understood as a ‘structured attempt to resolve radical disagreement between conflict parties’,<sup>4</sup> which varies considerably in scope, content, complexity, and goals. However, anti-corruption measures established within peace processes will not guarantee that corruption cannot become endemic in the reformed political settlement (see Box 1).<sup>5</sup>

This U4 Issue presents evidence on how often anti-corruption provisions appear and are used in peace processes, interpreted through peace agreements over a 34-year period. Using data from the University of Edinburgh’s Peace Agreements (PA-X) Database,<sup>6</sup> it analyses the prevalence and content of *explicit* anti-corruption provisions identified in 140 peace agreements signed as part of 62 peace processes between 1990 and 2023. The analysis does not include negotiated outcomes that contain *implicit* anti-corruption provisions, such as strengthening institutions and the rule of law.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Rose-Ackerman 2008; Spector 2010, p. 416.

2. IEP 2015.

3. Bell et al. 2024a, p. 11.

4. PeaceRep 2024.

5. Haass and Ottmann 2017.

6. Bell et al. 2024a.

7. According to the World Bank, aspects that promote anti-corruption in peace processes include: improving public sector management; institutional restraints on power; increasing political accountability; increasing civil society participation; and the creation of a competitive economic sector (Boucher et al. 2007, p. 6.). Also see Forster 2020; Le Billon 2014, p. 770.



### Box 1: Corruption in war-to-peace transitions

Post-war corruption can take many forms – from elite cronyism to endemic corruption affecting large segments of the population. After successive peace agreements in South Sudan, ‘embezzlement, bribery, and misappropriation of state funds by political elites’ remained merely the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of corrupt practices (OHCHR 2021). Whereas, in Afghanistan, ‘administrative bribery was singled out as placing the greatest burden on the economic wellbeing of Afghan citizens’ (UNODC 2012, p. 7). The type of corruption depends on which actor holds entrusted authority. For instance, after the 2017 liberation of Mosul, Iraq, non-state militias requested bribes from the displaced to ensure their ‘safe’ return (SIPRI 2019, p. 1). Peace tends not to influence the level of corruption and the anti-corruption measures established within peace processes do not guarantee that corruption will not become endemic (Jarvis 2020, p. 169). In countries such as Afghanistan and Nepal, back-room deals and organised crime operated as alternative conflict-resolution mechanisms (Jarvis 2020; Goodhand 2008). It is argued that the use of power-sharing may increase the prevalence of corruption in the post-settlement phase (Haass and Ottmann 2017). Power-sharing in the executive may be used by negotiators to deter spoilers and ‘buy the peace’ and allow warring parties to secure rent through state office – for instance, as seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (early 2000s) and Liberia (1993–2001) (Cheng and Zaum 2008, p. 303–4.). Such systems do not promote a ‘positive’ (sustainable) peace but can promote a quasi-stable situation of ‘no war, no peace’ lasting many years (Cheng and Zaum 2008, p. 303–4).

With heightened calls to incorporate an anti-corruption agenda in peace processes, the focus on explicit anti-corruption provisions allows us to establish a *precedent* of how anti-corruption measures have been incorporated in peace agreements. This also enables us to see the *extent* of these practices, which has not been documented in the literature. The emphasis is not on identifying best practice<sup>8</sup> – the examples used are decontextualised. Rather, the aim is to identify the content and language of anti-corruption to improve understanding, create an instructive body of case study examples, and establish a precedent for practitioners, which has been lacking.<sup>9</sup> The analysis highlights the gaps in previous approaches and suggests where additional

8. An example is the Peace and National Partnership Agreement that formed a power-sharing government in bad faith between the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen and the Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) in 2014.

9. Kovács 2024, p. 40.

efforts can be made in the intersectionality of anti-corruption measures, such as in regard to broad societal participation and gender inclusion.

This U4 Issue does not seek to argue that including anti-corruption measures in peace agreements should be the norm in every negotiated peace process. The absence of anti-corruption provisions in peace agreement texts is a result of various complex factors, including that the anti-corruption agenda may be pushed down to the technical level or into negotiation channels that run in parallel to the ‘political track’, such as the ‘constitutional track’. Also, anti-corruption measures may be explored in other fora of negotiation that operate alongside the peace process, including the judiciary or the legislature.

The research questions guiding this inquiry are:

- How are anti-corruption initiatives incorporated and conceptualised in peace processes?
- How often do peace agreements provide for anti-corruption and at what stage of the negotiations?
- What type of anti-corruption approaches are provided for?

To answer these questions, the U4 Issue draws on data from the Peace Agreements (PA-X) Database that assembles 2,055 peace agreements from between 1990 and 2023. The database includes 156 agreements that address ‘corruption’ – which pertains to ‘any mention of measures to address corruption, including references to auditing (eg the establishment of an auditor general) and mechanisms for “transparency and accountability.”<sup>10</sup> Using the methodology of Braun and Clarke (2006), corruption references were further coded into 32 sub-categories related to anti-corruption initiatives and rhetoric.<sup>11</sup> The final dataset consisted of 140 agreements signed as part of 62 different peace processes (listed in Annex 2). Each agreement has affiliated metadata which factors into the analysis: country, name of agreement, date, agreement type, peace process name, and so forth. Less clear is the analysis of ‘provisions’, which is used in this U4 Issue to broadly refer to articles, sections or paragraphs in a peace agreement. A provision can vary widely in detail and scope – from multiple paragraphs to a short bullet point – and so there is no attempt to provide any descriptive statistics concerning the number of anti-corruption provisions. Of the 140 agreements analysed in this scoping study, most (112) are ‘intra-state’ related to civil wars, with 14 agreements are ‘inter-state related

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10. Bell et al. 2024a, p. 72.

11. For an overview of coding, see Annex 1. Secondary coding removed 16 agreements not directly addressing anti-corruption, including references to criminal activities, trafficking of narcotics, smuggling, kidnapping, extortion and terrorism, as well as references to ‘transparency in elections’.



to intra-state conflict' and 12 agreements are 'inter-group', (that is, local or sub-state). Two agreements are 'inter-state agreements'.

The following section provides an overview of the prevalence of anti-corruption provisions in peace agreements over a 34-year period. It further outlines when anti-corruption provisions are most likely to be incorporated into a peace process.

# Anti-corruption measures in peace agreements 1990–2023

**Inclusion of anti-corruption provisions early in the process can help legitimise peace agreement implementation.**

Peace processes are opportune moments to seek reform in the political settlement of a post-war country or region. Aspects confirmed in a peace agreement – such as the foundation of rule of law, and strong public financial management – can help to establish strong institutions and systems of good governance. This can boost the legitimacy of a process and help to avoid conflict recidivism.<sup>12</sup> The inclusion of anti-corruption provisions early in peace processes can help to legitimise the agreement's implementation and stabilise conflict. Within policy circles, anti-corruption measures are one of the avenues explored in contemporary peace processes when dealing with how to engage non-state criminal actors (such as cartels).<sup>13</sup> Also, target 16.4 of UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 seeks to 'significantly reduce illicit financial (and arms) flows by 2030, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime.' Integrating anti-corruption initiatives into peace settlements, therefore, ranks highly on practitioner and scholarly agendas worldwide.<sup>14</sup>

Of 171 peace processes, anti-corruption provisions appear in 62 (see Annex 2). This means that 36% of peace processes mention anti-corruption, but in two-thirds of these processes, provisions are limited in scope or largely rhetorical. Only ten peace processes contain a broad range of coded provisions that address multiple aspects of anti-corruption (15–44 codes) (see Box 2); 13 processes contain a mid-tier range of coded provisions across agreements (6–14 codes),<sup>15</sup> and 39 processes contain five or fewer codes.<sup>16</sup>

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12. Hegre and Nygård 2015.

13. Amaya-Panche 2024.

14. Spector 2012, p. 46; Lindberg and Orjuela 2014, p. 728; UNDP 2010.

15. Sudanese (North-South) process, Liberia peace process, South African peace process, Iraq (second Gulf war) process, South Sudan (pre-secession local peace processes), Sudan transition process post-2019, Sri Lanka (Kumaratunga) process, Sierra Leone process, Lebanon peace process, Togo peace process, Kenya peace process, Mozambique de-partisanship process, Kurdistan process (Iraq).

16. Rhetorical anti-corruption provisions appear in a limited capacity in inter-group (non-state) agreements from eight countries (Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Sudan, and South Sudan/Sudan).

**Anti-corruption provisions appear in 62 of 171 peace processes (36%), in a dataset of 140 peace agreements.**

## **Box 2: Agreements with detailed anti-corruption provisions**

### **Burundi**

Arusha Accords, 2000

### **Colombia**

Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas, 2014

Agreement on Security Guarantees, 2016

Final Agreement & Agreement on Security Guarantees, 2016

### **Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Sun City Agreement, 2003

Transitional Constitution, 2004

### **Libya**

Libyan Political Agreement, 2015

### **Nepal**

Constitution of Nepal, 2015

### **Somalia**

Provisional Constitution, 2012

### **South Sudan**

ARCSS, 2015

R-ARCSS, 2018

### **Yemen**

NDC Outcomes Document & Peace and National Partnership Agreement, 2014

### **Zimbabwe**

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (no. 20), 2013


*The post-2000s donor agreements on Afghanistan included a broad scope of anti-corruption provisions across multiple agreements, but no particular agreement stands out in regard to anti-corruption content in contrast to the processes above.*

On average, 7% of all peace agreements mention anti-corruption. This reflects that it is not necessary or prudent to include anti-corruption in every agreement during a peace process. Of the 199 comprehensive peace agreements on PA-X, 41 (21%)

contain anti-corruption provisions. This indicates that anti-corruption measures are nearly three times as likely to be incorporated during stages aimed at broad institutional reform.

The adoption of anti-corruption initiatives in peace agreements was most frequent between 2003 and 2015 (see Figure 1). In general, the prevalence of anti-corruption provisions varies across different time periods, and a larger number of agreements containing detailed anti-corruption clauses were signed after 2010 (see Box 2).

**Figure 1: Percentage of agreements containing anti-corruption provisions per year**



The drop in peace agreements containing anti-corruption provisions in the past decade (see Figure 1) is related to factors such as: a proliferation in the marketplace of states’ mediating agreements (many of them illiberal); a move away from UN negotiated peace process frameworks (Libya, Yemen, Syria, and so on), which has pushed negotiations to away from the national level to the subnational level; and a drop in the number of comprehensive peace agreements signed since 2015.<sup>17</sup>

17. Badanjak and Peter 2024, p. 36.

# Anti-corruption initiatives in peace mediation stages


**61% of anti-corruption provisions appear in framework agreements and comprehensive peace agreements.**

In the peace agreements that mention anti-corruption, 61% of provisions appear in framework agreements and comprehensive peace agreements. These agreement categories represent the more substantive peace agreement types that include extensive reforms with broad societal implications. This indicates that discussions of anti-corruption require greater levels of confidence between mediating parties that must sit with one another over longer periods during the drafting process.

Anti-corruption initiatives and references are not usually incorporated into other peace agreement types (see Figure 3). In ceasefire agreements, corruption provisions may be included ad hoc as confidence-building measures, but this is uncommon. One example appears in Myanmar's 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement which commits to planning projects in local communities according to the standards of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.


Anti-corruption provisions in ceasefires could have the potential of increasing transparency, but are unlikely to increase accountability due to a lack of overall governance in place. The absence of anti-corruption provisions in ceasefires further highlights the sensitivities of including anti-corruption measures and potential weaponisation of such provisions against opposition parties. Ceasefires can also include a prohibition on inflammatory rhetoric between conflict parties. Under these terms, accusations of corruption could be interpreted as a ceasefire violation. Therefore, instead of using specific anti-corruption clauses, a ceasefire may represent an opportunity to outline *implicit* provisions for anti-corruption such as strengthening good governance.

Figure 2: Peace agreement types and non-linearity of sequencing



Credit: Source: Drawn from Bell et al. (2024b). by-nc

Figure 3: Anti-corruption provisions across peace process stage



Half of pre-negotiation agreements that have anti-corruption provisions mention anti-corruption rhetorically as a principle to be incorporated in negotiations. In some instances, in preparation for further discussions, a pre-negotiation agreement may provide an understanding of how corruption has contributed to a conflict – such as the following example from Nigeria:



‘... the Berom people with the connivance of the Plateau State Government (Nigeria) and the police have consistently [limited Fulani rights] through confiscation of their legally acquired lands and orchestrated attacks.’<sup>18</sup>

Overall, anti-corruption provisions are only found in 29 of the 537 pre-negotiation agreements included on the PA-X Database, indicating that it is not a widespread practice.

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18. Nigeria, Declaration of Intent (by the Fulani Dialogue Steering Committee), 15 May 2013.

# Why aren't there more anti-corruption references in peace agreements?

The relative absence of specific references to anti-corruption in peace agreement texts highlights multiple tensions between the anti-corruption and peace mediation agendas. First, these limitations show the sensitivities surrounding the integration of anti-corruption among negotiating parties. This can be circumvented by avoiding the language and terms of anti-corruption and instead relying on the interpretation of good governance, reforming public management, and instituting competent checks and balances.

Second, the absence of anti-corruption provisions may indicate a desire among certain actors to avoid oversight during the transitional phase. This could be to secure their position with the state's political elite networks through cronyism. It could also involve purchasing alliances through mutually beneficial (and corrupt) business opportunities. Substantive anti-corruption reforms and enforcement mechanisms are usually contained in comprehensive peace agreements including 'peace agreement constitutions'.<sup>19</sup> This may indicate that, even without high levels of trust, conflict parties are willing to discuss and adopt anti-corruption measures when they have sufficient confidence in the process. This coincides with the moment when a process is more inclusive, indicating that perhaps expanding beyond politically elite groups helps place anti-corruption initiatives higher on the mediation agenda. Other factors must be considered, including a mediator's sensitivity to good governance concerns, civil society pressures, and the increased involvement of multilateral actors in constitution-building.

Third, when included in peace agreement texts, 'corruption' is usually interpreted as an 'illegal act'. The appearance of codes of ethics and other anti-corruption principles not defined as legal or illegal highlights how some conflict parties attempt to institute anti-corruption as a set of norms in an attempt to overcome partisan definitions of corruption that can be mobilised to de-legitimise opponents and potentially undermine peace gains.

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19. Nathan 2020.

# Types of anti-corruption content in peace agreements

In addition to descriptive provisions where agreements spell out specific practices that are considered corrupt,<sup>20</sup> there are four main types of anti-corruption provisions.

The two most prevalent types relate to the ‘implementation of anti-corruption measures’ and ‘commitment to anti-corruption reform in specific sectors’ (see Table 1). The third-largest category relates to provisions that give rhetorical commitments to anti-corruption. The smallest category relates to dealing with past instances of corruption and asset recovery.

**Table 1: Frequency of coding for anti-corruption sub-categories**

Provision type	No. of peace agreements
Implementation of anti-corruption measures	98
Commitment to anti-corruption reform in specific sectors	79
Rhetorical commitments	48
Dealing with past corruption, asset recovery	11

An overview of coding and frequency of codes is available in Annex 1.

‘Implementation of anti-corruption measures’ includes provisions on legal reform, use of international law, ways of enforcing anti-corruption measures, how third parties are incorporated, as well as tools such as codes of ethics, vetting, disclosure procedures and laws, public awareness and training, and the use of conditional funding. Provisions including ‘commitments to anti-corruption reform’ usually commit to reforms in the civil service, private sector, electoral reforms, judicial, and instituting anti-corruption in economic interest are as such as illicit financial flows

20. According to the coding category ‘language > terms for corruption’ (from 24 agreements), practices identified as corruption in peace agreements include: sabotage; embezzlement; waste and damage to public property; malevolence; defamation; fraud; malpractice; misappropriation; influence peddling; nepotism; favouritism; tribalism; regionalism; political patronage; clientelism; sexual harassment; bribery; abuse of power; forgery and deceitfulness; informal taxation; forceful collection of donations and financial support; creating a hurdle to legitimate development activities; and financial inducement.

and natural resource extraction. ‘Rhetorical commitments to anti-corruption’ include general statements committing the parties to the principles of anti-corruption and can stand as single provisions or appear alongside more substantive provisions. Last, provisions ‘dealing with past corruption’ seek to implement retrospective justice in regards to corrupt activities, including the recovery of assets.

## Commitments to transparency

Commitments to transparency are among the most prevalent clauses. References are most often rhetorical – they do not include implementable actions – but in several cases they may include clauses specifying the disclosure of funds by senior officials; reporting requirements by public bodies; the implementation of freedom of information acts and other similar transparency regulations; and guarantees of media access to information.

For example, the 2014 National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document from Yemen notes, that:

‘...the law shall provide guarantees to access information by citizens, [civil society organisations] and the media, use of such information and to perform a role in monitoring and enhancing aspects of transparency in public policies, administrative actions, especially those related to finance to enable citizens, political parties and stakeholders [to perform] their role in the process of control and accountability.’

## Legal reform

Legal reform to promote anti-corruption is also among the most common provisions relating to implementing an anti-corruption agenda. Many provisions are limited to signalling intent to conduct legal reform to bolster anti-corruption principles. A 2006 agreement from Nepal, for instance, notes that ‘policies shall be adopted to take strict actions against those who, occupying governmental positions of benefit, have amassed huge properties through corruption’.<sup>21</sup>

Other texts contain regulations that will become law through ratification by the legislature or as a constitutional amendment (extrajudicial or inline with constitutional parameters).<sup>22</sup> Prohibitions may also include practices that are identified as corruption, such as the following example from Cibitoke province,

21. Nepal, Decisions of the Seven Party Alliance-Maoist Summit Meeting, 8 November 2006, p. 5.

22. Bell and Forster 2020.

Burundi, which notes: ‘do not request pots of wines, because they are in fact of corrupt practices’.<sup>23</sup>

Legal reform promoting anti-corruption can touch on any area where corruption is identified. This includes procurement and tendering, election funding, taxation, governance of state properties, and regulation of financial services. One specific case from Cote d’Ivoire relates to legal reform to bolster anti-corruption in the regulation of citizenship.<sup>24</sup> Provisions also regularly established to ensure transparency, due process, and to avoid conflicts of interest, such as by prohibiting senior officials’ family members from working in customs and taxation, and prohibiting senior officials from appointing civil servants.<sup>25</sup>

## Sectoral reform

Multiple agreements commit to anti-corruption reforms in specific sectors of the political system or economy. Two main aspects emphasised in the public sector were the ‘civil service’ and ‘systemic’ – that is, non-specified inter-sectoral reform. In Guatemala, for instance, an agreement underscored the importance of the state being run by a ‘skilled labour force’, drawing links between civil service professionalism and integrity.<sup>26</sup> This is further reflected by 15 agreements that highlight the use of codes of ethics, honour, or professionalism for senior officials and members of the civil service, thereby promoting cultures of integrity. Other agreements attempt to tackle the underlying politicisation of state structures through the verification of civil servant backgrounds in contexts as diverse as Colombia, Iraq, and Mozambique.<sup>27</sup>

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23. Burundi, Social contract between farmers and pastoralists in the commune Rugombo, Cibitoke province, 23 March 2006, p. 3.

24. Cote d’Ivoire, Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, 23 January 2003, p. 5.

25. Afghanistan, London Conference Communique, 28 January 2010, p. 3; Yemen, National Dialogue Conference (NDC) Outcomes Document, 25 January 2014, p. 77.

26. Guatemala, Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 6 May 1996, p. 4.

27. For instance, Colombia, Agreement on security guarantees, 23 June 2016, pp. 16-17.

Table 2: Commitments to sectoral reform

Public/economic sector	Sector	Coding frequency in 140 peace agreements
Public sector	Civil service, public administration	23 agreements
	Systemic reform (non-specified sector)	17
	Security sector incl. police, gendarmerie, military	14
	Judiciary	12
	Elections	11
Economic sector	Private sector and procurement mechanism	16
	Natural resource extraction	10
	Finance and illicit financial flows	8

## Establishing enforcement bodies

The most frequent provisions include establishing (or reforming) anti-corruption enforcement and oversight bodies. The ‘creation of a committee to fight corruption and financial mismanagement’, one agreement from Mali notes, is central to the promotion of ‘genuine national reconciliation.’<sup>28</sup> There are three main types of enforcement body relating to audit, corruption commissions, and budgetary oversight. Other less common means of anti-corruption enforcement (the ‘other’ category) include courts and ‘self-enforcement’ or ‘self-monitoring’ (mostly found in the security services).

### ▪ Auditing and compliance bodies

Peace agreements (or legal reforms) may establish and enable an Office of General Audit and provide for its internal governance, checks and balances, and processes of recruitment, censure, or replacement. Audit bodies are often set up alongside other anti-corruption mechanisms. In Afghanistan, parties outline a comprehensive roadmap for the establishment of several anti-corruption bodies.

28. Mali, Accord Pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali, 20 June 2015, p. 11.



Provision for creation of an Audit Law means they can also rely on external audits of the Control and Audit Office.<sup>29</sup> Other agreements opt to reform existing auditing bodies or their mandates, such as agreements from the Central African Republic, Comoros, Gabon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nepal, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Rarely are the intelligence services placed under the purview of a state audit authority.<sup>30</sup> No agreement provides for an audit during the war-to-peace transition as a means of increasing confidence in the peace process.

Power over the Auditor General's Office is particularly fraught in circumstances of territorial power-sharing. In Liberia's 1993 Cotonou Agreement, the position of Auditor General was subject to a power-sharing arrangement. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers argued for autonomy of the Auditor General in the northeast.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile, in an agreement between the Autonomous Bougainville Government and the Papua New Guinea National Government, the mandate of state audits is discussed in the context of the larger territorial power-sharing arrangement. In the final agreement it was stated that Port Moresby could withhold budgetary funding if there were cases of abuse, misuse, or misappropriation of public funds in Bougainville that were not sufficiently dealt with by local officials.<sup>32</sup>

- **Budgetary oversight**

Provisions on budgetary regulation, reform and oversight aim to counter corruption by strengthening public management. A common aspect in multiple agreements relates to transparency and accountability, as well as the prohibition on multiple budgets or supplementary budgets. Addressing imbalances in the public budget and rationalising expenditures is seen as an important pillar in the anti-corruption reforms envisioned by the 2014 Peace and National Partnership Agreement in Yemen.<sup>33</sup>

- **Anti-corruption commissions**

Implemented through peace accords, such commissions are varied in structure and mandate. Some, such as the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, are not strictly limited to anti-corruption. They can investigate a broad spectrum of issues, including human rights violations.<sup>34</sup> Most agreements demonstrate two main modalities: either they provide a generic stipulation for the establishment of an anti-corruption commission without additional detail; or

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29. Afghanistan, Kabul Conference Communique, 22 July 2010, p. 3.

30. However, a suggestion to include intelligence services is expected in Yemen, NDC Outcomes Document, 25 January 2014, p. 97.

31. Sri Lanka, The LTTE's Proposal for an Agreement to Establish an Interim Self-Governing Authority in for the Northeast, 31 October 2003, p. 4.

32. Papua New Guinea, Bougainville Peace Agreement, 30 August 2001, p. 44.

33. Yemen, The Peace and National Partnership Agreement, 21 September 2014, p. 2.

34. Kenya, Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation – Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, 4 March 2008, p. 1.

comprehensive peace agreements may include extensive provisions outlining the structure, mandate and bylaws governing such an entity, often in parallel with other necessary reforms.<sup>35</sup> South Sudan's 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) provided for the review of the 2009 Anti-Corruption Commission Act. It emphasised the institutional independency of the commission and its protection from political interference. It also stipulated the harmonisation of the Anti-Corruption Commission's work with the Ministry of Justice, the police force, and the Public Prosecution.

#### ▪ **Other means of enforcement**

In addition to auditing and anti-corruption commissions, agreements may establish other pathways of enforcing anti-corruption regulations, including the establishment of anti-corruption courts, and strengthening the Public Prosecution, among others. Several agreements seek to harmonise anti-corruption efforts between the various modalities identified in the sections above with additional ministries and entities. In Mozambique, the parties established the Commission for Monitoring the De-Partisanship of the State. In Colombia, the parties committed to establishing an Integrated Information System as well as an inter-agency group to combat corruption in the implementation of the 2016 Final Agreement.<sup>36</sup> Agreements may note how anti-corruption bodies are located in the hierarchy of the state, and the branch of government – executive, legislative, judiciary – they should coordinate with. Alternatively, they may establish chains of reporting and ombudsmen to allow for whistleblowing, and other protections. Sectoral commissions – particularly electoral commissions – may be responsible for deterring corruption in their particular sector.\* Several agreements stipulate that the police will combat corruption.<sup>37</sup>

## Involving third parties

Third-party involvement in anti-corruption efforts range from active involvement<sup>38</sup> to operating as independent auditors.<sup>39</sup> In the context of government contracts, the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement provides for collaboration with 'independent international experts' if necessary (p. 29). The international community may more

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35. Ireland/UK, *New Decade, New Approach*, 10 January 2020; Nepal, *Constitution of Nepal*, 20 September 2015, p. 99; Zimbabwe, *Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (no. 20)*, 19 March 2013, pp. 100-101; Liberia, *Accra Agreement*, 18 March 2003, p. 12; DRC, *Sun City Agreement*, 2 April 2003, p. 72.

36. Colombia, *Final Agreement*, 24 November 2016, p. 210.

37. Sudan, *Sudan Peace Agreement (Juba Agreement)*, 3 October 2020, p. 128.

38. Iraq, *Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the UN and the Gov. of Iraq on the implementation of UNSCR 986*, 20 May 1996, p. 5.

39. Somalia, *Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia*, 1 August 2012, 37; Sri Lanka, *The LTTE's Proposal for an Agreement to Establish an Interim Self-Governing Authority in for the Northeast*, 31 October 2003, p. 4.

generally be identified as the guarantor of the implementation process. Third parties may be called on to safeguard vulnerable communities from corruption, including displaced persons (especially women).<sup>40</sup>

Third parties mentioned in agreements include the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, international groups of ‘friends’,<sup>41</sup> UN organisations or missions including the United Nations Development Programme or African Union Mission in Somalia, or international non-governmental organisations. For instance, in South Sudan, parties commit to ‘joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to enhance accountability in the management of the petroleum and mining industry.’<sup>42</sup> A third party to anti-corruption monitoring or enforcement may also include representatives from the international or local media.<sup>43</sup>

## International law

Only a handful of agreements call for anti-corruption legislation to align with international agreements.<sup>44</sup> Five agreements from Afghanistan and South Sudan reference the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) directly and Afghanistan provides a timeline for the convention’s ratification. Afghanistan also stipulates the implementation of recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force – Asia Pacific Group on anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing.<sup>45</sup> The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) and its revised R-ARCSS agreement provide for South Sudan’s accession into UNCAC as well as the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. This echoes the practice of referencing UN Security Council resolutions and international conventions in peace processes regarding other areas of strategic concern, such as affirming the rights and inclusion of women.

## Broadening participation

One of the key requirements for combating corruption is public investment in anti-corruption measures to ensure that people have access to the necessary tools.<sup>46</sup> As noted by the 2013 Participación Política agreement in Colombia:

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40. Sudan, Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006, p. 42.

41. Such as the International Contact Group on Liberia.

42. South Sudan, ARCSS, 17 August 2015, p. 34.

43. Aceh, Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, 15 August 2005, p. 6.

44. Afghanistan, London Conference Communique, 28 January 2010; Yemen, NDC Outcomes Document, pp. 80-82.

45. Afghanistan, Tokyo Conference, 8 July 2012, p. 11.

46. Boucher et al. 2007, x.

‘Citizen participation and control are essential to ensuring the transparency of public administration and that resources are used correctly. It is also an important part of making progress in the fight against corruption and the penetration of criminal structures in public institutions.’<sup>47</sup>

Broad societal participation is noted as a barrier to corruption. It achieves this through monitoring and oversight, and opening public channels of communication about corruption (such as via ombudsmen). Despite this, participation does not intersect with anti-corruption in many agreements. In some contexts, members of civil society may be recruited to national anti-corruption bodies.<sup>48</sup> In the DRC, for instance, civil society representatives were appointed to anti-corruption institutions during the period of transitional government. Alternatively, agreements may stipulate that the planning of activities likely to impact local communities – such as natural resource extraction – requires the participation of opposition groups to ensure transparency, as was the case in Myanmar.

## Incorporating gender issues

Gender issues are mostly incorporated in anti-corruption measures through generic references to ‘men and women’, with a few exceptions. The 2018 R-ARCSS agreement from South Sudan states that women’s organisations should be involved in policy advocacy against corruption. In Colombia, strengthening the justice system to ensure transparency and deter ‘private justice’ is recognised as contributing ‘to ensuring the effective administration of justice in cases of gender violence, free of gender-based stereotypes or sexual orientation’.<sup>49</sup> The agreement further emphasises the protection of women, children and adolescents affected by criminal organisations. A similar provision relates to displaced women in the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.<sup>50</sup>

The 2003 Sun City Agreement from the DRC places ‘clientelism, sexual harassment, bribery, [and] the abuse of power’ on its list of ‘anti-values and non-transparent practices’. The sandwiching of ‘sexual harassment’ between otherwise well-established acts of corruption implies a recognition of ‘sexual corruption’ – that is, when an entrusted authority abuses their power to obtain a sexual favour in exchange for a service or benefit.\* An agreement may stipulate a quota for women’s

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47. Colombia, *Participación Política : Apertura democrática para construir la paz*, 6 November 2023, p. 15.

48. Liberia, *Accra Agreement*, 18 August 2003, p. 9; DRC, *Sun City Agreement*, 2 April 2003; DRC, *Accord Politique pour la gestion consensuelle de la transition en République Démocratique du Congo*, 19 April 2002, p. 2.

49. Colombia, *Agreement on Security Guarantees*, 23 June 2016, pp. 2-3.

50. Sudan, *Darfur Peace Agreement*, 5 May 2006, p. 42.

participation in anti-corruption bodies, such as the Interim Anti-Corruption Commission in Somalia or the Governance Reform Commission in Liberia.<sup>51</sup>

## Other anti-corruption measures

Agreements may include several additional methods for promoting anti-corruption. The most frequent is the establishment or reform of a ‘code of ethics’, which appears in 15 agreements. The next most common aspect includes the dismissal or impeachment of civil servants and political leadership on the grounds of corruption and incompetence. This is usually pursued by a body in a different branch of government (that is, a judge may be dismissed by the president; the president dismissed by the legislature, and so on). On rare occasions, an agreement may provide for a purge:

‘As a matter of urgency and priority, the Broad-based Transitional Government shall rid the administrative apparatus of all incompetent elements as well as authorities who were involved in the social strife or whose activities are an obstacle to the democratic process.’<sup>52</sup>

Other methods include the vetting and disbarment of political figures involved in corruption, or placing conditions on funding (from national to regional government, or from UN to governmental) based on adherence to anti-corruption principles. A handful of agreements provide for awareness campaigns, training, or educational programmes aimed at deterring corruption. As noted in a 2002 agreement from Sudan: ‘bribery must be eliminated by civil authorities at all levels [...] through good policies, conducting political rallies, seminars and workshops, mass enlightenment and civic education.’<sup>53</sup>

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51. Somalia, Kampala Roadmap, 6 September 2011, 11; Liberia, Accra Agreement, 18 August 2003, p. 12.

52. Rwanda, Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing, 30 October 1992, p. 14.

53. South Sudan/Sudan. Outcome of the First Consultative Pankar Agreement, 20 September 2002, p. 20.

# The potential for improving anti-corruption measures in peace mediation

**Gaps in existing practice present the potential for future improvements in introducing anti-corruption measures.**

Despite the inclusion of anti-corruption measures in a third of peace processes over the past 34 years, their scope is often limited and unambitious. This highlights the potential and the challenges that practitioners face, and the gaps in existing practice. Throughout the dataset, there are no agreements with anti-corruption provisions related to the health, environmental, migration, and education sectors. Only a handful of agreements touch on the areas of asset return, illicit financial flows, gender, procurement, resource extraction, and customs. The absence of anti-corruption initiatives highlight a paradox inherent in peace processes in that there is a risk that the new political settlement emerging after an agreement is signed helps facilitate the capture of the state by the political elites making the deal. Another reason is that certain groups fear that anti-corruption measures may be used against them, thereby jeopardising greater support for the peace process.<sup>54</sup> Conflict parties and mediators may also interpret corruption as an issue that can be handled separately to, or after, the mediation process. Potentially, there could also be a lack of expertise on how to integrate anti-corruption measures into a process.

**Implicit anti-corruption initiatives could also be incorporated into peace agreements via larger structural reforms.**

Using anti-corruption measures in a peace process comes with explicit restraints, particularly when the peace agreement, as a highly sensitive political document, may not be the ideal platform for extensive anti-corruption reforms. To navigate this, negotiators can defer the detailed initiatives to supplementary frameworks that allow for gradual, context-specific implementation. Implicit anti-corruption

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54. Hopp-Nishanka, Rogers, and Humphreys 2022, p. 25.



initiatives may be incorporated into peace agreements via larger structural reforms to promote transparency and good governance – which could boost accountability. The absence of the anti-corruption measures detailed above may be a result of the anti-corruption agenda being pushed down to the technical level or moved into other negotiation fora operating in parallel to the main political route. Alternative fora include the legislature, constitutional reform bodies, executive decisions, judicial decisions, and working groups which provide valuable pathways for incorporating anti-corruption reforms and mechanisms.

**The legislature, constitutional reform bodies, executive decisions, and judicial decisions, provide valuable pathways for strengthening explicit commitments to anti-corruption reforms.**

Underexplored entry points in peace agreements should be considered for further development. While references to anti-corruption measures are made, they often lack substance. It is important to find ways to translate general sentiments and expressed commitments into actionable steps. This can be achieved through various approaches, including collaboration with political elites, engaging at the technical level, and fostering grassroots support. To circumvent the politically fraught decision of whether to include anti-corruption measures or not, rhetorical commitments offer a compromise. However, as highlighted by a 2024 study on the Bangsamoro peace process in the Philippines, it is easy for rhetorical commitments in peace agreements to remain unimplemented when they are not effectively translated into actionable steps.<sup>55</sup>

Minimal inclusion of anti-corruption measures within a peace process could be limited to:

1. The signing, ratification and integration of UNCAC into domestic law
2. Joining EITI and integrating the principles of transparency into local, regional, and state bodies, and enhancing the role of civil society in these processes.
3. Reforming or establishing an independent commission focused on good governance – including provisions outlining its core operating principles in line with the 2012 Jakarta Principles.<sup>56</sup> Such a commission is also an opportunity for the inclusion of a 30-50% gender quota. In the meantime, establish an interim good governance commission with a clear timeline for establishing an

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55. Kovács 2024.

56. Clarified by UNODC 2020.

independent commission, which shall ensure that the negotiated settlement adequately considers and addresses principals of good governance during implementation.

Each of the above items should include timeframes for implementation to ease their incorporation into subsequent implementation agreements and to monitor the implementation process.

# Annex 1

## Anti-corruption provisions in peace agreements

Category	Code	Agreements that include the category	Percentage of total 2,055 agreements on PA-X Database
Generic	General commitment to anti-corruption	48	2.3
	Anti-corruption as a duty	10	0.5
	Roadmap	17	0.8
Language of anti-corruption	Terms for corruption/corrupt activities	24	1.2
	Concepts linked to corruption	32	1.6
	Consequences of corruption	6	0.3
	Reasons for corruption	5	0.2
Substantive provisions/implementation	Commitment to transparency/disclosure	38	1.8
	Legal reform	29	1.4
	Enforcement/other bodies	39	1.9
	Enforcement/auditing body	23	1.1
	Enforcement/anti-corruption commission	25	1.2
	Enforcement/national budget	11	0.5
	Enforcement/self-regulation	4	0.2
	International law	10	0.5
	Third-party monitoring/assistance	19	0.9
	Safeguarding and whistleblowers	6	0.3

Category	Code	Agreements that include the category	Percentage of total 2,055 agreements on PA-X Database
	Code of ethics	15	0.7
	Vetting public figures	11	0.5
	Disclosure of information/Freedom of Information laws	13	0.6
	Education, public awareness, training	8	0.4
	Conditional funding	2	0.1
Substantive	Dealing with past corruption and asset recovery	11	0.5
Substantive/reform	Civil service reform	23	1.1
	Private sector reform, including procurement regulations	13	0.6
	Security sector reform, including police, military, rebel groups	14	0.7
	Electoral reform (substantial) (not including generic 'transparency in elections clauses')	11	0.5
	Judicial reform	12	0.6
	Systemic reform (multisector and unspecified sector)	23	0.8
	Participation (general)	21	0.7
	Participation/gender	16	0.4
	Dealing with natural resources	10	0.5
	Dealing with illicit financial flows	5	0.2

## Annex 2

### List of peace agreements including references to anti-corruption

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
Afghanistan	London Conference	1 Feb 2006	Afghanistan: 2000s post-intervention process
	Paris Conference	12 June 2008	
	London Conference Communique	28 Jan 2010	
	The Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace Jirga	6 June 2010	
	Renewed Commitment by the Afghan Government to the Kabul Conference Communique	22 July 2010	
	Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan	2 Nov 2011	
	Bonn Conference	5 Dec 2011	
	Tokyo Conference	8 July 2012	
	Agreement between the two campaign teams regarding the structure of the national unity government	21 Sept 2014	
Algeria	Plate-forme portant consensus national sur la période transitoire	26 Jan 1994	Algeria: Bouteflika process
Bahrain	Bahrain National Dialogue Proposals, Executive Summary	28 July 2011	Bahrain: Reform-based peace process
Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Yugoslavia	Political agreement on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path	12 June 2002	Bosnia peace process
Burundi	Déclaration des partis politiques agréés et du gouvernement contre les fauteurs de guerre et en faveur de la paix et de la sécurité	6 July 1994	Burundi: Arusha and related peace process

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi	28 Aug 2000	
	Constitution de transition du 28 Octobre 2001	28 Oct 2001	
	Constitution of 18 March 2005	18 Mar 2005	
	Social contract between farmers and pastoralists in the commune Rugombo, Cibitoke province, Burundi	23 Mar 2006	Burundi: Local process
Cambodia	Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the UN on Cambodia Incorporating the Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict	28 Aug 1990	Cambodian peace process
	Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Paris Accords)	23 Oct 1991	
Central African Republic (CAR)	Bangui National Reconciliation Conference	5 Mar 1998	CAR: Bangui process
	Transitional National Charter (Interim Constitution)	18 July 2013	CAR: coups and rebellions process
	Pacte Républicain pour la paix, la réconciliation nationale et la reconstruction en la République Centrafricaine	11 May 2015	
	Synthesis of the Harmonised Claims of the Armed Groups of the RCO Bouar, of 30 August 2018	30 Aug 2018	CAR: African Initiative (and related) process
	Khartoum Accord	5 Feb 2019	
Chad	Accord de paix entre le gouvernement de la République du Tchad et le Mouvement National (MN)	25 July 2009	Chad: Fourth war process
Colombia	Acuerdo de 'Agenda Común por el Cambio hacia una Nueva Colombia', Gobierno Nacional-FARC-EP	6 May 1999	Colombia III – Arango
	Comunicado FARC-Gobierno del viaje a Europa, 23 de Febrero de 2000	23 Feb 2000	



Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
	Comunicado FARC-Gobierno del viaje a Europa, 2 de Marzo de 2000	2 Mar 2000	
	Acuerdo sobre Reglamento para la Zona de Encuentro, Gobierno Nacional-ELN	14 Dec 2000	
	General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace	26 Aug 2012	
	Participación política: Apertura democrática para construir la paz	6 Nov 2013	
	Solucion al Problema de las Drogas Illicitas	16 May 2014	
	Agreement between National Government and ELN to establish peace talks in Colombia	30 Mar 2016	Colombia V – Santos
	Agreement on security guarantees	23 June 2016	
	Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace	24 Nov 2016	
	Acuerdo de Mexico	10 Mar 2023	Colombia VI – Government-ELN post-2015 process
Comoros/ (Anjouan)	Accords d'Antananarivo	23 Apr 1999	Comoros- Anjouan islands peace process
	Maroni Agreement	20 Dec 2003	
Cote d'Ivoire	Linah-Marcoussis Agreement	23 Jan 2003	Cote D'Ivoire: peace process
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Acte d'Engagement Gaborone	24 Aug 2001	DRC: Second Congo War process
	Draft Constitution of the Transition	1 Apr 2003	
	The Sun City Agreement	2 Apr 2003	
	Accord Politique pour la gestion consensuelle de la transition	19 Apr 2002	
	The Pretoria Agreement	16 Dec 2002	

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
	Compte Rendu de la Rencontre Entre la Delegation du Gouvernement de la RDC Conduite par le Ministre de la Defence et la Delegation du Group Arme du Commandant Cobra Matata, en Presence de la MONUC a Aveba	18 Nov 2006	DRC: Eastern DRC processes
	Declaration finale du forum sur la paix dans le territoire de Nyunzu	10 Dec 2015	DRC: local agreements (East)
Gabon	Accord de Paris	7 Oct 1994	Gabon peace process
Guatemala	Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation	6 May 1996	Guatemala peace process
	Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society	19 Sept 1996	
	Stockholm Agreement	7 Dec 1996	
India/ (Darjeeling)	The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (Amendment) Act 1994	28 Feb 1994	India-Darjeeling peace process
India/ (Bodoland)	Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council	10 Feb 2003	India Bodoland peace process
Indonesia/ (Aceh)	Third Meeting of the Joint Forum, Switzerland, 23–24 September 2000	24 Sept 2000	Indonesia-Aceh peace process
	Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding	15 Aug 2005	
Iraq/ (UN)	Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 986	20 May 1996	Iraq peace process – first Iraq war
	Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the Republic of Iraq	23 Feb 1998	
Iraq	Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period	8 Mar 2004	Iraq peace process – second Iraq war
	United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1546	8 June 2004	
	Constitution of Iraq	15 Oct 2005	

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
Iraq/ (Kurds-Kurdistan)	Erbil Agreement	7 Nov 2010	Kurdistan/Iraq territorial conflict
Ireland/ United Kingdom/ (Northern Ireland)	New Decade, New Approach	10 Jan 2020	Northern Ireland peace process
Israel/ (Palestine)	A Performance Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	30 Apr 2003	Israel-Palestine peace process
Kenya	Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Annotated Agenda and Timetable	1 Feb 2008	Kenya peace process
	Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation: How to Resolve the Political Crisis	14 Feb 2008	
	Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation – Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission	4 Mar 2008	
	Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, Statement of Principles on Long-term Issues and Solutions	23 May 2008	
	Resolutions of Peace and Cohesion Meeting of Leaders from Mt. Elgon Sub-counties, Bungoma, County: Abbey Resort Resolutions	31 Mar 2015	Kenya local agreements
Lebanon	Memorandum of Understanding between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement	6 Feb 2006	Lebanon peace process
Lesotho	The Electoral Pledge	11 Dec 2014	Lesotho process
Liberia	Abuja Peace Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement	19 Aug 1995	Liberia peace process
	Accra Agreement	18 Aug 2003	
Libya	Libyan Political Agreement (Sukhairat Agreement)	17 Dec 2015	Libyan peace process

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
	Palermo Conference for and with Libya, Conclusions	13 Nov 2018	
	Roadmap for the Preparatory Phase of a Comprehensive Solution	19 Nov 2020	
	The Second Berlin Conference on Libya	23 June 2021	
	Declaration of the Paris International Conference for Libya	12 Nov 2021	
	Reconciliation Charter between Tebu and Zway Tribes from Kufra	20 Feb 2018	Libyan local processes
Mali/ (Azawad)	Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali – Issu du Processus d’Alger	20 June 2015	Mali-Azawad Inter-Azawad peace process
Mozambique	Declaração de Princípios sobre a despartidarização da Função Pública	23 June 2015	Mozambique process – post-2012 Renamo insurgency
Myanmar	11-Point Common Position of Ethnic Resistance Organizations on Nationwide Ceasefire (Laiza Agreement)	2 Nov 2013	Myanmar ceasefires process with ethnic armed groups
	The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organisations	15 Oct 2015	
Nepal	25-Point Ceasefire Code of Conduct Agreed between the Government of Nepal and SPN (Maoist)	25 May 2006	Nepal peace process
	Decisions of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) – Maoist Summit Meeting	8 Nov 2006	
	Comprehensive Agreement concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	21 Nov 2006	
	Nepal Interim Constitution	15 Jan 2007	
	23-Point Agreement between the Top Leaders of the Seven-Party Alliance	23 Dec 2007	
	Constitution of Nepal 2015	20 Sept 2015	

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
Nigeria	Kafanchan Peace Declaration, The Southern Kaduna State Inter-communal Dialogue	23 Mar 2016	Nigeria – local agreements
Nigeria/ (Plateau State)	Declaration of Intent (by the Fulani Dialogue Steering Committee)	19 May 2013	Nigeria – Plateau state process
	Declaration of Intent and Signatures	10 July 2013	
Pakistan/ (Taliban)	Ahmadzai Wazir Wana Peace Agreement	15 Apr 2007	Pakistan-Taliban process
Papua New Guinea/ (Bougainville)	Bougainville Peace Agreement	30 Aug 2001	Bougainville: peace process
Philippines/ (Mindanao)	Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro	15 Oct 2012	Philippines – Mindanao process
	The Independent Commission on Policing and its Terms of Reference	27 Feb 2013	
Rwanda	Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing within the Framework of broad-based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front	30 Oct 1992	Rwanda-RPF process
Sierra Leone	Abidjan Accord	30 Nov 1996	Sierra Leone peace process
	Lomé Agreement	7 July 1999	
Somalia	The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic	29 Jan 2004	Somalia peace process
	Decision on the High-Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement	25 Nov 2008	
	The Kampala Accord	9 June 2011	
	Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia	1 Aug 2012	
	Kampala Roadmap	6 Sept 2011	
	Protocol Establishing the Technical Selection Committee	22 June 2012	
	End of Transition Roadmap	6 Aug 2012	

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
	Agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubba Delegation	27 Aug 2013	
Somalia/ (Puntland)	Agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland State of Somalia	14 Oct 2014	
South Africa	National Peace Accord	14 Sept 1991	South Africa peace process
	South African Constitution of 1993 (Interim Constitution)	18 Nov 1993	
South Sudan	Yau Yau Agreement	9 May 2014	South Sudan: Post-secession Local agreements
	Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements Towards Resolution of the Crises in South Sudan	25 Aug 2014	South Sudan post-secession process
	Framework for Intra-SPLM Dialogue	20 Oct 2014	
	Arusha Agreement	21 Jan 2015	
	Areas of Agreement on the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National unity (TGoNU) in the Republic of South Sudan	1 Feb 2015	
	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS)	17 Aug 2015	
	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)	12 Sept 2018	
	Rome Initiative for Political Dialogue in South Sudan, Declaration of Principles, 10 March 2021, Naivasha, Kenya	10 Mar 2021	
Waat Lou Nuer Covenant	6 Nov 1999		
South Sudan/ Sudan	Outcome of the First Consultative Pankar Agreement	20 Sept 2002	South Sudan: pre-secession local peace processes
	Outcome of the Second Pankar Consultative Meeting	31 Oct 2002	

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
	Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA During the Pre-interim and Interim Periods	31 Dec 2004	
	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Naivasha Agreement)	9 Jan 2005	
	Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Cairo Agreement)	18 June 2005	Sudanese (North-South) peace process
	The Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005	6 July 2005	
South Sudan/ Sudan/ (Darfur)	Juba Declaration on Dialogue and National Consensus	30 Sept 2009	
Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka Constitution Bill, an Act to Repeal and Replace the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	3 Aug 2000	Sri Lanka Kumaratunga/devolution processes
	The LTTE's Proposal for an Agreement to Establish an Interim Self-Governing Authority for the Northeast	31 Oct 2003	Sri Lanka LTTE 2002 onward process
Sudan	Framework agreement between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Darfur Track	28 Dec 2019	
	Juba Agreement	3 Oct 2020	Sudan transition process
	Draft Political Framework Agreement	15 May 2022	
Sudan/ (Darfur)	Darfur Peace Agreement	5 May 2006	Darfur-Sudan peace process
Sudan/ (Eastern Sudan)	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement	19 June 2006	Eastern Sudanese peace process
Togo	Dialogue Inter-Togolais: Accord Cadre de Lomé	27 Sept 1999	
	Dialogue Inter-Togolais: Accord Politique Global	20 Aug 2006	Togo peace process

Country	Agreement name	Date	Peace process
Tunisia	Charte d'Honneur des Partis Politiques, des Coalitions et des Candidats Indépendants pour les élections et les référendums de la République Tunisienne	22 July 2014	Tunisia reform process
Yemen	National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document	25 Jan 2014	Yemen peace process
	The Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA)	21 Sept 2014	
	Riyadh agreement between the legitimate Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (STC)	5 Nov 2019	
Zimbabwe	Memorandum of Understanding between the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) and the two Movement for the Democratic Change Formations	21 July 2008	Zimbabwe post-election process
	Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Global Political Agreement	15 Sept 2008	
	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) 2013	19 Mar 2013	



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# About the author

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